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A commentary on
Neural signatures of intransitive preferences
by Kalenscher, T., Tobler, P. N., Huijbers, W., Daselaar, S. M. and Pennartz, C. (2010).
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 4:49. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2010.00049
Kalenscher et al. (2010) explored the neural signatures of intransitive preferences. This endeavor
is of great interest because transitivity of preferences has long been considered a key feature
of rationality. The success of this approach hinges upon appropriate methods for identifying
decision makers with intransitive preferences. The authors invented a descriptive numerical “index
of intransitivity” (henceforth labeled K. Index) that we argue is not grounded in a quantitative
model of choice behavior. We revisit the authors’ original data and reclassify the participants
using two well-known and well-established quantitative criteria for transitive preferences, the
random preference model of transitive linear orders (Block and Marschak, 1960; Becker et al.,
1963) and weak stochastic transitivity (Block and Marschak, 1960; Tversky, 1969; Iverson and
Falmagne, 1985). These two models of transitive preferences embody two different ways to
capture uncertainty/variability of behavior formally. According to the random preference model,
preferences are probabilistic, while responses are deterministic (error-free). According to weak
stochastic transitivity, preferences are deterministic and responses are probabilistic (noisy). Suitable
statistical tests for these models have only recently become broadly available.
Similar to the seminal study of Tversky (1969), Kalenscher et al.’s task consisted of two-
alternative forced choices among binary lotteries, with reward size and probability of a reward
trading off against each other. Using a set of five lotteries, the data of interest consist of 200
responses per person, 20 repetitions for each of the 10 pairs of lotteries. Eighteen of their 30
participants scored a K. Index > 0.3 and were classified as intransitive. The authors motivated
the K. Index as a means to evaluate weak stochastic transitivity.
Economists and psychologists have studied the conceptual challenges of taking a deterministic
axiom like transitivity and expanding it into a probability model to incorporate the inherent
uncertainty in human behavior (Luce, 1959; Block and Marschak, 1960; Luce and Narens, 1994;
Loomes and Sugden, 1995; Hey, 2005). Equally importantly, recent work has provided the statistical
tools needed to evaluate such models (Myung et al., 2005; Davis-Stober, 2009; Cavagnaro and
Davis-Stober, 2014; Regenwetter et al., 2014). Regenwetter et al. (2010, 2011a) gave an in-depth
critique of the literature on testing transitivity of preferences. These papers contributed three main
points relevant to this discussion:
1. They promoted random preference models as a compelling probabilistic specification of
transitivity.
2. They offered the first proper statistical test of the random preference model using “order-
constrained inference” methods, and one of the first proper direct statistical tests of weak
stochastic transitivity.
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TABLE 1 | Reanalysis of Kalenscher et al.’s data.
Participant K. Index RPT WST RPLS LSE Best model
1 0.21 19.41 8.15 3.10 0.17 RP Transitive
2 0.36 0.0027 0.019 0.01 0.05 Unconstrained
3 0.605 <0.001 <0.001 9.01 0.04 RP Lexicographic semiorder
4 0.065 0.82 8.52 0.21 0.083 Weak stochastic transitivity
5 0.30 <0.001 <0.001 0.89 0.08 Unconstrained
6 0.36 2.21 0.92 <0.001 0.01 -
7 0.31 0.019 0.16 9.01 0.24 RP Lexicographic semiorder
8 0.005 3.57 8.53 2.49 0.08 Weak stochastic transitivity
9 0.26 14.77 2.44 56.28 0.40 RP lexicographic semiorder
10 0.41 2.11 0.11 <0.001 0.01 -
11 0.26 1.90 3.97 <0.001 0.05 Weak stochastic transitivity
12 0.15 5.49 8.37 3.35 0.09 Weak stochastic transitivity
13 0.43 <0.001 0.002 2.33 0.08 -
14 0.050 1.31 8.53 0.18 0.08 Weak stochastic transitivity
15 0.33 <0.001 <0.001 1.07 0.08 Unconstrained
16 0.37 <0.001 <0.001 0.66 0.07 -
17 0.42 1.67 0.42 <0.001 0.01 -
18 0.050 7.76 8.53 1.01 0.08 Weak stochastic transitivity
19 0.39 2.62 0.78 <0.001 0.07 -
20 0.39 1.26 0.32 0.08 0.04 -
21 0.43 1.19 0.45 <0.001 0.01 -
22 0.36 <0.001 <0.001 33.32 0.07 RP lexicographic semiorder
23 0.20 0.01 3.46 <0.001 0.07 Weak stochastic transitivity
24 0.42 11.21 1.44 0.01 0.07 RP transitive
25 0.40 3.32 0.30 0.09 0.13 RP transitive
26 0.29 19.54 6.84 0.03 0.09 RP transitive
27 0.35 6.73 1.84 0.01 0.01 RP transitive
28 0.33 1.30 0.48 0.03 0.06 -
29 0.25 0.35 5.29 <0.001 0.03 Weak stochastic transitivity
30 0.0067 13.65 8.53 8.91 0.09 RP transitive
For each of 30 participants, we report the Kalenscher et al. degree of intransitivity score (K. Index) and Bayes factors for RPT, WST, RPLS, and LSE. We boldface K. Index values
(> 0.3) that fail to support transitivity. We italicize Bayes factors (<
√
0.1) that fail to strongly support a given model. The “Best model” column gives the model with the highest Bayes
factor. When the unconstrained model is strongly supported over all four models, “Best model” gives “unconstrained.” All other cases are marked with “-” to indicate that they are not
conclusive. “<0.001” indicates that the calculated Bayes factor is less than 0.001 indicating considerable support for the unconstrained model.
3. They discussed conceptual, mathematical, and statistical
problems of commonly used descriptive indices similar to
K. Index (see, e.g., Regenwetter et al., 2011a, Figure 4).
According to the random preference model of transitivity (RPT),
a decision maker may have any transitive preference ≻ with
(unknown) probability P≻. The binary choice probability, p(x, y)
that a decision maker chooses x when offered the choice between
x and y is the total probability of all those transitive preference
states ≻ according to which x is preferable to y, i.e., x ≻ y.
Formally,
p(x, y) =
∑
preference states≻
in which x ≻ y
P≻. (1)
According to this model, a decision maker has probabilistic
transitive preference states and responds in an error-free fashion.
Understanding the mathematical and statistical properties of this
model has been the subject of a sophisticated technical literature.
According to weak stochastic transitivity (WST), a decision
maker has a single (unknown) deterministic transitive preference
state. Regardless of that preference state, the decision maker gives
probabilistic responses due to “errors” and the probability of an
error is bounded above by 12 . Formally, for any triple of distinct
alternatives, x, y, z,
if p(x, y) ≥ 1
2
and p(y, z) ≥ 1
2
, then p(x, z) ≥ 1
2
.
According to this model, a decision maker has one deterministic
transitive preference state and responds in a noisy fashion.
Despite appearances, this model is mathematically nontrivial. For
five choice alternatives, it forms the disjoint union of 120 different
hypercubes in a 10-dimensional parameter space (Regenwetter
et al., 2010).
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We also consider two models that permit, but do not require,
intransitive preference states. Respondents with lexicographic
semiorder preferences examine attributes (such as probability
or payoff) sequentially until values on one attribute differ
sufficiently (Tversky, 1969). Put very simply, a random preference
model of lexicographic semiorders (RPLS) essentially uses
lexicographic semiorders for≻ in Equation 1 (Regenwetter et al.,
2011b; Davis-Stober, 2012). A lexicographic semiorder errormodel
(LSE) assumes a single (unknown) deterministic lexicographic
semiorder ≻ and error-prone responses such that, essentially,
x ≻ y implies p(x, y) ≥ 12 . The online supplement specifies these
two models fully.
Table 1 shows our reanalysis of Kalenscher et al.’s data.
Columns 3–6 give each respondent’s Bayes factor for each
model compared to an unconstrained model. The latter does
not constrain binary choice probabilities in any way. Following
standard practice (Jeffreys, 1961), a Bayes factor larger than√
10 (≈ 3.16) is considered strong evidence in favor of a given
model over another. The column “Best model” provides the
model with the highest Bayes factor among models supported by
strong evidence. Following Cavagnaro and Davis-Stober (2014),
we computed these Bayes factors using the order-constrained
methodology of Klugkist and Hoijtink (2007).
Seven participants were classified according to a lexicographic
model or the unconstrained model (i.e., allow intransitivity),
compared to the K. Index which favored intransitivity for
18 participants. We selected RPT for six and WST for eight
participants. The remaining nine cases produced insufficient
evidence for classification. All participants we classified as
unconstrained were also classified as intransitive by the K. Index.
Notice the nonmonotonic relationship between the K. Index and
the Bayes factors. Compare Participants 5 and 24. Participant 5
barely made it to be classified as intransitive by the K. Index while
the Bayesian analysis found very strong evidence against both
RPT and WST. Participant 24 had a much larger K. Index, while
the Bayesian analysis strongly favored RPT and slightly favored
WST. A frequentist test of each model, where applicable, yielded
good agreement with the Bayesian approach (see Supplementary
Table).
We recommend three refinements to the approach of
Kalenscher et al. (2010). First, disregard the K. Index as a measure
of intransitivity. Second, focus the fMRI analyses on only those
participants for whom we identified a best model in Table 1.
This recommendation might require additional participants to
achieve sufficient statistical power. Third, look also for distinct
neural signatures of random preference vs. error models as
these models correspond to differences in the locus of choice
variability: generated either via shifting preference states or error-
prone responses.
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